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ARTICLES
The New Federalism Meets the Eleventh
Circuit's Old Criminal Law
JONATHAN D. COLAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Eleventh Circuit's recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence
reflects the limited effect the Supreme Court's recent line of Commerce
Clause decisions has had in restricting the scope of federal criminal law.
Although, beginning in United States v. Lopez,' and continuing through
United States v. Morrison,2 the Supreme Court has emphasized the lim-
its of federal power under the Constitution's Commerce Clause, the cri-
teria used by the Supreme Court to weigh the constitutionality of federal
statutes has not led to a revolution in federal criminal law. As the
Supreme Court has marked the outer limits of federal power, the Elev-
enth Circuit has reaffirmed federal criminal statutory authority in the
areas of firearm possession and sales involving felons, interstate arson
crimes, child pornography, sexual communications and trafficking, the
Hobbs Act, identity theft, and sex offender registration. While each suc-
cessive Supreme Court opinion has triggered new rounds of constitu-
tional challenges, the Eleventh Circuit has not wavered in its analysis,
and federal criminal law practice in the Eleventh Circuit has remained
relatively stable during this period.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S EVOLVING CLARITY REGARDING
CONGRESS'S COMMERCE CLAUSE POWERS3
In 1996, after more than fifty years of recognizing the breadth of
* Jonathan D. Colan is an appellate lawyer at the United States Attorney's Office for the
Southern District of Florida and an Adjunct Professor of Issues in Appellate Law at the University
of Miami School of Law. The views expressed in this article are solely the author's and do not
represent the Department of Justice or the University of Miami School of Law.
1. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free Schools Zones Act of 1990).
2. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the Violence Against Women Act of 1994
("VAWA")). Morrison also analyzed whether VAWA was a permissible exercise of Congress's
enforcement authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but that analysis is beyond
the scope of this article. See id. at 619-27.
3. I offer, below, only a brief overview of the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence starting with Lopez, because the focus of this article is the Eleventh Circuit's
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federal commerce power, the Supreme Court "shocked constitutional
observers by asserting a judicially-enforceable limit on the power of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce." 4 In United States v. Lopez,
federal prosecutors charged a twelfth-grade student who brought a
loaded, concealed .38-caliber handgun to school with violating the Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990.' The Supreme Court held that despite
its history of upholding federal commerce authority, "even these mod-
em-era precedents which have expanded congressional power under the
Commerce Clause confirm that this power is subject to outer limits."6
The Supreme Court started with "first principles" of American fed-
eralism, noting that "[t]he Constitution creates a Federal Government of
enumerated powers" and that those powers are "'few and defined." 7
The Constitution grants to Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes."8
In Lopez, the Supreme Court recognized
three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under
its commerce power. First, Congress may regulate the use of the
channels of interstate commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to
regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may
come only from intrastate activities. Finally, Congress' commerce
authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a sub-
stantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce.9
The Supreme Court emphasized that within this final category, "the
proper test requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity 'sub-
stantially affects' interstate commerce."' 0
The statute in question in Lopez "made it a federal offense 'for any
individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual
knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.""' The
application of the Supreme Court's guidance on this issue to various federal criminal statutes. A
host of more expansive analyses of these Supreme Court decisions exists.
4. Lino A. Graglia, Lopez, Morrison, and Raich: Federalism in the Rehnquist Court, 31
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 761, 764 (2008).
5. 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995); see 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1990) (amending 18
U.S.C. § 922 (1988)).
6. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-57.
7. Id. at 552 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
9. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
10. Id. at 559.
11. Id. at 551 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) ( Supp. V 1990) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 922
(1988)).
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Supreme Court held that the law exceeded Congress's commerce author-
ity because it "neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a
requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate
commerce."' 2 The statute contained "no jurisdictional element which
would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession
in question affects interstate commerce."' 3 The Supreme Court con-
cluded that because neither the defendant nor the firearm had moved in
interstate commerce, "[tlhe possession of a gun in a local school zone is
in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition else-
where, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce."14
In United States v. Ballinger, the Eleventh Circuit received Lopez's
"synthesi[s of] more than a century of Commerce Clause activity" as the
"definitive description of the commerce power."' 5 Ballinger upheld the
conviction of a man who engaged in an interstate arson spree targeting
church buildings.' 6 The statute at issue, 18 U.S.C. § 247, made it a fed-
eral crime to "deface[ ], damage[ ], or destroy[ ] any religious real prop-
erty, because of the religious character of that property, or attempt[ ] to
do so[, or to] intentionally obstruct[ ], by force or threat of force, any
person in the enjoyment of that person's free exercise of religious
beliefs, or attempt[ ] to do so," when, for jurisdictional purposes, such
conduct "is in or affects interstate or foreign commerce."' 7 The Eleventh
Circuit held that "the statute falls squarely within Congress' power
under the first two Lopez prongs to regulate the channels and instrumen-
talities of commerce."' 8
Rejecting Ballinger's argument that the Commerce Clause would
only allow Congress to proscribe harmful activity "whose ultimate actus
reus occurs within a channel of commerce," the Eleventh Circuit held
that "[s]urely, utilizing the channels and instrumentalities of commerce
to facilitate a prolonged, multistate church-burning spree qualifies as an
'injurious use' that Congress may proscribe pursuant to its commerce
power."' 9 The Eleventh Circuit noted that, unlike the statute at issue in
Lopez, 18 U.S.C. § 247 contained an express jurisdictional statement
addressing conduct "in or affect[ing] commerce. '2° By addressing con-
duct "in commerce," the statute constitutionally addressed the channels
12. Id.
13. Id. at 561.
14. Id. at 567.
15. United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1225 (1 1th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S.
829 (2005).
16. Id. at 1221-22.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 247(a), (b) (2002).
18. Ballinger, 395 F.3d at 1227.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1235.
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and instrumentalities of commerce, even if it did not also substantially
affect commerce.
Five years after Lopez, in United States v. Morrison, the Supreme
Court considered whether Congress's commerce authority included the
power to provide a federal civil remedy against a person who commits
"a crime of violence motivated by gender. '22 Proponents of the law
sought to defend it under the third Lopez prong "as a regulation of activ-
ity that substantially affects interstate commerce. 23 The Supreme Court,
however, noted that "[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in
any sense of the phrase, economic activity" and that, like the act at issue
in Lopez, VAWA "contains no jurisdictional element establishing that
the federal cause of action is in pursuance of Congress' power to regu-
late interstate commerce. 24 In Morrison, the Supreme Court specifically
refrained from adopting a "categorical rule against aggregating the
effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide [Commerce
Clause] cases," but did note that "thus far in our Nation's history our
cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity
only where that activity is economic in nature."21 5 Allowing the aggrega-
tion of non-economic activity for Commerce Clause analyses, the
Supreme Court reasoned, would allow Congress to regulate any criminal
activity "as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has
substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or consump-
tion.' '26 The Supreme Court, accordingly, "reject[ed] the argument that
Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based
solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce. "27
Thus, "[t]he regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not
directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in inter-
state commerce" was reserved for the States. 8
The Supreme Court clarified the scope of its Commerce Clause rul-
ings in Gonzalez v. Raich 9.2  After identifying what lay outside Con-
21. Id. at 1236 (noting the statute's satisfaction of the first two Lopez prongs and rejecting the
defendant's argument that the statute also needed to satisfy the third Lopez prong). See Jones v.
United States, 529 U.S. 848, 854-57 (2000) (distinguishing between property that is "used in"
interstate commerce and property "affecting" interstate commerce).
22. 529 U.S. 598, 605-07 (2000) (quoting VAWA, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1994)).
23. Id. at 609.
24. Id. at 613.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 615.
27. Id. at 617.
28. Id. at 618 (emphasis added).
29. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. I, 32-33 (2005) (upholding Congress's power to prohibit
local cultivation and use of marijuana permitted under state law).
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gress's commerce powers in Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme Court
took a step back to reaffirm the scope of powers still left to Congress.
Opponents of the federal law in Raich did not dispute Congress's
general power to regulate the illegal drug trade; they only challenged the
law's application to incidents of intrastate manufacture and possession
of marijuana in compliance with state law.3" The Supreme Court held
that Congress has the power "to regulate purely local activities that are
part of an economic 'class of activities' that have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce."' 3' "[W]hen 'a general regulatory statute bears a
substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual
instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.'"32 Relying on
its New Deal era decision in Wickard v. Filburn,33 the Supreme Court
stated that "Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not
itself 'commercial,' in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that
failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of
the interstate market in that commodity. 34 The fact that the impact on
the market of the individual activity at issue in a particular application of
the law was "trivial by itself' was not sufficient to render the law an
unconstitutional application of Congress's commerce power.35 Unlike
activities such as gun possession near schools3 6 or gender-based vio-
lence, 37 the activity addressed by the statutory scheme in Raich (produc-
tion, distribution, and consumption of a product-specifically, drugs)
was "quintessentially economic. ' 38 The Supreme Court held that
because the Controlled Substances Act is a statute that "directly regu-
lates economic, commercial activity," the Court's prior opinion in Mor-
rison cast no doubt on the statute's constitutionality.39
The Supreme Court's Raich decision disappointed those who had
hoped the Lopez and Morrison decisions would lead to a revolution in
American federalism,4° and pleased those who defend a broader role for
30. Id. at 15. See also id. at 23 (distinguishing the facial challenges in Lopez and Morrison
from the as-applied challenge by the litigants in Raich).
31. Id. at 17 (citations omitted).
32. Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)).
33. 317 U.S. 11 (1942) (upholding the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938's regulation of
wheat production).
34. Raich, 545 U.S. at 18.
35. See id. at 20 (discussing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127 (1942)).
36. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549.
37. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
38. Raich, 545 U.S. at 25.
39. Id. at 26.
40. Accord Graglia, supra note 4, at 790-91; David L. Luck, Note, Guns, Drugs and...
Federalism?-Gonzalez v. Raich Enfeebles the Rehnquist Court's Lopez-Morrison Framework,
61 U. MIAMI L. REv. 237, 279-80 (2006).
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federal power.4 At least with respect to the application of federal crimi-
nal law within the Eleventh Circuit, no revolution has appeared.
III. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S STEADY APPLICATION OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAW IN THE WAKE OF THE SUPREME COURT'S EVOLVING
COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Felon-In-Possession of Firearms or Ammunition
As far back as 1996, not quite a year after the Supreme Court
issued its Lopez decision, the Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. McAl-
lister, reaffirmed the validity of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)'s federal prohibition
on the possession of firearms by convicted felons.4 z The statute made it
a federal crime for any person who had been convicted of a felony "to
ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or
affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any fire-
arm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate
or foreign commerce."43 The Eleventh Circuit stated that in bringing his
Commerce Clause challenge, "McAllister misunderstands the scope of
Lopez."" The Eleventh Circuit noted the Supreme Court's recognition
that the Gun-Free School Zones Act at issue in Lopez "'by its terms has
nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise.'
By contrast, the express jurisdictional statement in § 922(g) "mak[ing] it
unlawful for a felon to 'possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or
ammunition'" defeated McAllister's facial challenge to the statute as an
impermissible exercise of Congress's commerce clause power.46
The Eleventh Circuit also rejected McAllister's argument that
Lopez had "mark[ed] a significant change, rendering suspect the 'mini-
mal nexus' requirement established by the Supreme Court in Scarbor-
ough."'4 7 In that case, the Supreme Court held that the required
interstate commerce nexus in the predecessor felon-in-possession statute
was satisfied if the government could prove that the firearm had previ-
ously traveled in interstate commerce.4 8 The government had proven
that the firearm McAllister purchased in Georgia had been manufactured
41. Accord Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Government of Adequate Powers, 31 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 991, 992, 997 (2008).
42. United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 389 (11 th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 519 U.S. 905
(1996).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2005); McAllister, 77 F.3d at 389.
44. McAllister, 77 F.3d at 390.
45. Id. at 389 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
46. Id. at 390 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)).
47. Id. (discussing Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 575 (1977), upholding a
predecessor statute to § 922(g) on the grounds that the interstate commerce element is satisfied by
demonstrating a "minimal nexus" to commerce).
48. See id.; Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 575.
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in California and shipped to South Carolina.49 There was no analogous
requirement in Lopez that the government prove that the gun possessed
within the defined school zone had previously traveled in interstate com-
merce. The Eleventh Circuit relied on this distinction, reasoning that "a
law prohibiting the possession of a gun by a felon stems the flow of
guns in interstate commerce to criminals."5 ° The Eleventh Circuit held
that "[n]othing in Lopez suggests that the 'minimal nexus' test should be
changed," and that the government's proof that the gun McAllister pos-
sessed had traveled in interstate commerce defeated his as-applied chal-
lenge to the statute.5
Five years later, in United States v. Scott, the defendant argued that
the intervening Supreme Court decisions in Morrison and Jones52 called
into question the Eleventh Circuit's McAllister decision. 53 The Eleventh
Circuit noted that Jones merely interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) to avoid
any constitutional issue, by not applying its prohibitions to residences
not used for any commercial purpose, and that nothing in Morrison
altered its McAllister analysis.54 The jurisdictional element of § 922(g)
immunized the statute against a facial challenge.55 Morrison itself noted
the importance of jurisdictional statements in the constitutional analy-
sis. 56 The Eleventh Circuit also reiterated that, as applied to an individ-
ual defendant, § 922(g)(1) still required the government "to demonstrate
that that the firearm possessed traveled in interstate commerce. '' 51 The
"minimal nexus" to interstate commerce that sustained the felon-in-pos-
session statute in McAllister survived Morrison.58 The Eleventh Circuit
has recently reaffirmed that "McAllister remains controlling on this
issue."59
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Peters was an
even easier case, because it directly involved the sale of firearms to
49. McAllister, 77 F.3d at 388-89.
50. Id. at 390.
51. Id.
52. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 850-51 (2000) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)'s
federal criminalization of arson directed at "property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in
any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce" could not be constitutionally applied to a
case involving an "owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose ....").
53. United States v. Scott, 263 F.3d 1270, 1273-74 (1 1th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S.
1166 (2002).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1273.
56. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
57. Scott, 263 F.3d at 1274.
58. Id.
59. United States v. Charles, No. 09-12684, 2009 WL 5103556, at *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 29,
2009).
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felons.6' The court noted that both Lopez and Morrison "make clear that
when the challenged statute regulates activity that is plainly economic in
nature, no jurisdictional hook or congressional findings may be needed
to demonstrate that Congress properly exercised its commerce power. "61
The proper focus, under Lopez, was on "whether the regulated activity
'substantially affects interstate commerce,' . . . not [ ] whether an indi-
vidual instance of conduct prosecuted under the statute substantially
affects commerce."6" The Eleventh Circuit determined that Morrison
served to "reinforce[] this point."63
While the Court [in Morrison] cast real doubt on whether "aggregat-
ing the effects of any noneconomic activity" could establish a basis
for sustaining a Commerce Clause enactment, it reaffirmed the
Court's longstanding practice of "sustain[ing] federal regulation of
intrastate activity based upon the activity's substantial effects on
interstate commerce" when "the activity in question has been some
sort of economic endeavor." '
The Eleventh Circuit recalled its own long-standing recognition in
McAllister "that '[w]hen viewed in the aggregate, a law prohibiting the
possession of a gun by a felon stems the flow of guns in interstate com-
merce to criminals."65 Regulating the sale of guns to felons was merely
"the flip side of this coin."66
B. Child Pornography
One area of law in which the Eleventh Circuit's jurisprudence
changed in response to the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause cases is
its analysis of federal regulation of child pornography; albeit, the change
was in the direction of affirming the application of the law that it had
previously rejected. In this instance, Raich's clarification of the Supreme
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence altered Eleventh Circuit law in
favor of federal power.
In United States v. Maxwell [Maxwell I], the defendant was con-
victed of two counts of knowingly possessing child pornography in vio-
lation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B).67 The statute made it a federal
crime for any person to:
60. See United States v. Peters, 403 F.3d 1263, 1271 (1 1th Cir. 2005) ("Our focus today is on
this third [Lopez] category, since we have little trouble concluding that the sale of firearms to
felons directly and substantially affects interstate commerce.").
61. Id. at 1273.
62. Id. at 1274 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995)).
63. Id.
64. Id. (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611, 613 (2000)).
65. Id. at 1277 (quoting United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 390 (1 1th Cir. 1996)).
66. Id.
67. United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042, 1044 (11th Cir. 2004) (Maxwell 1).
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knowingly possess[] any book, magazine, periodical, film, video-
tape, computer disk, or any other material that contains an image of
child pornography that has been mailed, or shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer,
or that was produced using materials that have been mailed, or
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any
means, including by computer[.] 68
The government had not proven that the child pornography Maxwell
possessed had moved across state lines, only that the images were pro-
duced using materials that had.69 In its original review of Maxwell's
case, the Eleventh Circuit attempted to distinguish the Supreme Court's
upholding of wheat production regulations in Wickard v. Filburn:°
The regulation at issue ... has no clear economic purpose. It makes
no effort to control national trade by regulating intrastate activity.
Instead, it attempts to regulate primary conduct directly, even within
state borders. Unlike wheat, pornography is a nonrival good. Max-
well is charged with possessing it, and possessing pornography does
not result in its consumption such that the overall supply of pornogra-
phy in the market is reduced. In any event, Congress is clearly not
concerned with the supply of child pornography for the purpose of
avoiding surpluses and shortages or for the purpose of stimulating its
trade at increased prices.7
The Supreme Court vacated Maxwell I and remanded the case for recon-
sideration by the Eleventh Circuit in light of Raich.7"
On remand, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that Raich had taken a
broader view of Wickard and concluded that "'Congress can regulate
purely intrastate activity that is not itself 'commercial,' . . . if it con-
cludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the
regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.' ,,73 What distin-
guished Raich from Lopez and Morrison "was the comprehensiveness of
the economic component of the regulation," even if the individual con-
duct at issue was not itself commercial. 74 "[W]here Congress has
attempted to regulate (or eliminate) an interstate market, Raich grants
Congress substantial leeway to regulate purely intrastate activity
(whether economic or not) that it deems to have the capability, in the
aggregate, of frustrating the broader regulation of interstate economic
68. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (2006).
69. Maxwell 1, 386 F.3d at 1045.
70. See 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942).
71. Maxwell 1, 386 F.3d at 1057.
72. 546 U.S. 801 (2005) (Mem.).
73. United States v. Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 2006) (Maxwell II), cert.
denied, 549 U.S. 1070 (2006) (quoting Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18 (2005)).
74. See id.
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activity."75
The Eleventh Circuit heeded the Supreme Court's explanation of
Congress's commerce power in Raich. The court stated: "We find very
little to distinguish constitutionally Maxwell's claim from Raich's.
Indeed, much of the [Supreme] Court's analysis could serve as an opin-
ion in this case by simply replacing marijuana and the [Controlled Sub-
stances Act] with child pornography and the [Child Pornography
Prevention Act]."'7 6 Reconsidering the issue in light of Raich, the Elev-
enth Circuit affirmed the defendant's child pornography conviction,
without requiring the government to establish that the materials he pos-
sessed moved in interstate or foreign commerce.77
The Eleventh Circuit recently reaffirmed Maxwell II in United
States v. Culver.7 8 While Maxwell had been convicted of possessing
child pornography, Culver was convicted of producing it. Culver was
convicted on five counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 225 1(a), which makes
it a federal crime for:
[a]ny person [to] employ[ ], use[ ], persuade[ 1, induce[ ], entice[ ], or
coerce[ ] any minor to engage in... any sexually explicit conduct for
the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for
the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct...
if that visual depiction was produced or transmitted using materials
that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or affecting inter-
state or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer
79
Culver argued that the provision could not constitutionally apply to the
production of child pornography on 8mm videotape and that his conduct
did not meet the jurisdictional requirement of the statute.80
The Eleventh Circuit held that Culver's argument was foreclosed
by "[t]he reasoning of Maxwell II [which] applies with equal force to
§ 225 1(a)."'" The government had proved that the magnetic tape used to
create the visual images Culver produced was manufactured in Japan
and transported to Alabama.82 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that
"Culver's argument [that the magnetic tape did not fall within the stat-
75. Id. at 1215.
76. Id. at 1216.
77. Id. at 1219; see also United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1280-81 (1 1th Cir. 2006),
cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1137 (2007) (affirming the defendant's child pornography conviction after
its original decision reversing Smith's conviction was vacated by the Supreme Court in light of
Raich).
78. 598 F.3d 740 (11 th Cir. 2010).
79. Id. at 746 (quoting 18 U.S.C.A § 2251(a) (West 2008))
80. Id.
81. Id. at 747 n.4.
82. Id. at 747.
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ute's definition of materials] is inconsistent with the plain meaning of
the statute, and it ignores the fact that he could not have made the visual
depictions at issue without the magnetic tape."83
C. Communications with Minors for Sexual Purposes
The Eleventh Circuit had little difficulty upholding Congress's
power to prohibit sexually related communications with minors through
the use of the internet in United States v. Hornaday.4 18 U.S.C.
§ 2422(b) makes it a federal crime to
us[e] the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign com-
merce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States [to] knowingly persuade[ ], induce[ ], entice[ ], or
coerce[ ] any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to
engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can
be charged with a criminal offense.85
Hornaday was convicted after using the internet to contact a person
(who turned out to be an undercover government agent) to arrange for
sexual encounters with two children.86 Hornaday challenged his convic-
tion on, among other grounds, the argument that Congress lacked the
power to criminalize the use of instrumentalities or channels of interstate
commerce to seek out child victims, unless the instrumentalities or chan-
nels of interstate commerce (in this case, the internet) were themselves
used to communicate with the intended victims. 87
The Eleventh Circuit dispensed with Hornaday's argument,
quickly.
The internet is an instrumentality of interstate commerce. Congress
clearly has the power to regulate the internet, as it does other instru-
mentalities and channels of interstate commerce, and to prohibit its
use for harmful or immoral purposes regardless of whether those pur-
poses would have a primarily intrastate impact.88
The court analogized Congress's power to "prohibit the use of a tele-
phone or the internet to set up [a scheme to] sexual[ly] abuse . . . chil-
dren" with its power to "prohibit the use of [such] instrumentalities to
set up a fraudulent scheme or to arrange a . murder. 89
83. Id.
84. United States v. Hornaday, 392 F.3d 1306, 1310-11 (1lth Cir. 2004).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2006). Subsection (a) of the statute makes it a federal crime to
"persuade[], induce[], entice[], or coerce[] any individual to travel in interstate or foreign
commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, to engage in prostitution, or in
any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense." § 2422(a).
86. Hornaday, 392 F.3d at 1308-09.
87. Id. at 1311.
88. Id. (citations omitted).
89. See id.
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In United States v. Evans,9" the Eleventh Circuit upheld Congress's
constitutional authority to impose federal penalties on anyone who
knowingly in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.... recruits,
entices, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means a per-
son ... knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of
force, threats of force, fraud, coercion described in subsection (e)(2),
or any combination of such means will be used to cause the person to
engage in a commercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the
age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex
act.9
Evans raised the familiar argument that his conviction violated the Com-
merce Clause because all of his conduct occurred within Florida.9 2
The Eleventh Circuit relied on its prior applications of Raich in
Maxwell and Smith in rejecting Evans's argument.93 "Like the [Con-
trolled Substances Act] and the [Child Pornography Prevention Act], the
[Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 ("TVPA")] is part of a
comprehensive regulatory scheme. The TVPA criminalizes and attempts
to prevent slavery, involuntary servitude, and human trafficking for
commercial gain."94 Even if Evans's actions would have only involved
enticing a minor into prostitution within Florida, this action "had the
capacity when considered in the aggregate with similar conduct by
others, to frustrate Congress's broader regulation of interstate and for-
eign economic activity."95 In banning the sex trade nationally, Congress
had the power to ban it locally.
The Eleventh Circuit's Commerce Clause jurisprudence regarding
the use of the instrumentalities and channels of commerce to facilitate
the sexual abuse of children has held steady.96
D. The Hobbs Act
The Hobbs Act9 7 imposes federal criminal penalties on anyone who
"in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or
extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens
90. 476 F.3d 1176, 1177 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 878 (2007).
91. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1591(a)(1) (West 2008). Subsection (a)(2) of the statute makes it a federal
crime for anyone to "benefit[ ], financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in
a venture which has engaged in an act described in violation of paragraph (1)." § 1591(a)(2).
92. Evans, 476 F.3d at 1178.
93. Id. at 1179.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Faris, 583 F.3d 756, 758-59 (11 th Cir. 2009) (affirming a child
enticement conviction, relying on United States v. Homaday, 392 F.3d 1306 (11 th Cir. 2004)).
97. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2006).
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physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or
purpose to do anything in violation of this section."
The Eleventh Circuit has long held that the jurisdictional require-
ment under the Hobbs Act can be met simply by showing that the
offense had a "minimal" effect on commerce.98 In United States v.
Verbitskaya, the defendant argued that Lopez and Morrison called the
Eleventh Circuit's precedents into doubt.99 After considering the issue,
however, the Eleventh Circuit held that neither Lopez nor Morrison had
altered its previous Hobbs Act analyses and that proof of a minimal
effect on commerce was sufficient to sustain a Hobbs Act conviction." °°
The court noted that unlike the statutes rejected by the Supreme Court,
the Hobbs Act contained "an explicit jurisdictional element" tying
enforcement of the Hobbs Act to Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce.10
The Eleventh Circuit's "minimal" effects requirement for Hobbs
Act convictions remains good law.1"2
E. Identity Theft
The Eleventh Circuit similarly upheld the application of federal
identity-theft statutes based on a showing of a minimal nexus to inter-
state or foreign commerce, in United States v. Klopf.1 °3 Amongst the
jurisdictional provisions set forth in the federal identity-theft statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1028, is a provision prohibiting "the production, transfer, pos-
session, or use" of materials involved in identity theft "in or affect[ing]
interstate or foreign commerce."' 1 4 Klopf's conviction relied on the fact
that he "used one of [his] fraudulent identification documents to verify
his identity when applying for [a] storage facility, and, in turn, used that
facility to receive mail in connection with [a] credit-card scheme that
had a significant effect on interstate commerce."' 0 5
The Eleventh Circuit held that "[b]y requiring the government to
prove a minimal connection to interstate commerce ... this statute, in
contrast to those in [Lopez and Morrison], which did not contain juris-
dictional requirements, contains a sufficient jurisdictional requirement to
98. See United States v. Jackson, 748 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th Cir. 1984).
99. United States v. Verbitskaya, 406 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546
U.S. 1096 (2006).
100. Id.
101. Id. (quoting United States v. Gray, 260 F.3d 1267, 1274 (11th Cir. 2001)).
102. See United States v. White, 256 F. App'x 333, 336-37 (11th Cir.2007) (relying on
Verbitskaya, 406 F.3d at 1331-32).
103. United States v. Klopf, 423 F.3d 1228, 1239 (11 th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 311
(2008).
104. 18 U.S.C. § 1028(c)(3)(A) (2006).
105. Klopf, 423 F.3d at 1237.
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overcome a Commerce Clause challenge." 10 6 That minimal connection
could be satisfied by showing that the defendant "had only the intent to
accomplish acts, which, if successful, would have affected interstate or
foreign commerce."107 Klopf's conviction was affirmed because "suffi-
cient evidence support[ed] a finding that, even if he had not done so
already, he intended to use those driver's licenses in a manner that
would have affected interstate commerce significantly."' 8
The Eleventh Circuit recently reaffirmed KlopJ s minimal nexus
analysis, in United States v. Mendez.'0 9 The court held that the govern-
ment's proof that Mendez intended to use his fraudulent commercial
driver's license to operate a commercial vehicle "sufficiently affects
interstate commerce to satisfy the minimal nexus requirement" even if
Mendez never left Florida."'
F. The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
Last year, in United States v. Ambert, the Eleventh Circuit applied
the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence to the Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA")."' Ambert
challenged two aspects of SORNA on Commerce Clause grounds. One
section, 42 U.S.C. § 16913, requires sex offenders to "register, and keep
the registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides,
where the offender is an employee, and where the offender is a stu-
dent[,]"J 1 2 while another section, 18 U.S.C. § 2250, imposes federal
criminal penalties for "[w]hoever-(1) is required to register under
[SORNA]; (2)(A) is a sex offender as defined [by SORNA] ... ; or (B)
travels in interstate or foreign commerce, or enters or leaves, or resides
in, Indian country; and (3) knowingly fails to register or update a regis-
tration as required by [SORNA]." ' I 3 Congress's declared purpose in
enacting SORNA was "to protect the public from sex offenders and
offenders against children . . . [by] establish[ing] a comprehensive
national system for the registration of those offenders."" ' 4 Among vari-
ous other challenges to his conviction, Ambert challenged the constitu-
tionality of both the registration requirement and the criminal penalties
for failure to do so on the grounds that Congress exceeded its commerce
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1239.
108. Id.
109. United States v. Mendez, 528 F.3d 811,817 (11 th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 292
(2008).
110. Id.
111. 561 F.3d 1202, 1210-11 (11th Cir. 2009).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a) (2006).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006).
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powers in enacting them." 15
The Eleventh Circuit adopted the reasoning of a recent Eighth Cir-
cuit decision, United States v. Howell, in upholding Congress's power to
require sex offenders to register." 6 The court stated: "As the Eighth Cir-
cuit recognized, in enacting § 16913 of SORNA, Congress did not focus
on individual local registration as an end in itself, but rather as part of its
goal to create a system to track and regulate the movement of sex
offenders from one jurisdiction to another.' I7 Noting the statute's stated
purpose and its focus on offenders who cross jurisdictional boundaries,
the Eleventh Circuit stated that "[tihe only federal enforcement provi-
sion against individuals is found in § 2250, which explicitly subjects
state sex offenders to federal prosecution under SORNA only if they
'travel in interstate or foreign commerce' and fail to register under
§ 16913."' 18 The court explained that "when a sex offender travels from
one state to another, he is an instrumentality of interstate commerce, and
by regulating these persons in SORNA, Congress has acted under its
commerce clause power to regulate an instrumentality." " 9 The Eleventh
Circuit, thus, held that both SORNA's registration provision and its fed-
eral criminal penalties for failing to register fell within Congress's com-
merce authority.' 21
IV. CONCLUSION
While the last decade and a half has seen dramatic opinions from
the Supreme Court interpreting the scope of Congress's commerce
power and redefining American federalism, the Eleventh Circuit's appli-
cation of the Supreme Court's guidance to federal criminal law has been
less dramatic. The Eleventh Circuit has not ultimately sustained any
appellate challenges to a federal criminal statute under the Commerce
Clause during this period. Though the Supreme Court undoubtedly
found limits to Congress's commerce powers, the Eleventh Circuit has
found that the federal criminal statutes brought for its review have all
fallen within the limits of Congress's authority.
115. Ambert, 561 at 1204, 1210.
116. See id. at 1211-12 (discussing United States v. Howell, 552 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2009),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2812 (2009)).
117. Id. at 1212 (citing Howell, 552 F.3d at 716).
118. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2250).
119. Id. at 1211.
120. Id. at 1212; see also United States v. Powers, 562 F.3d 1342, 1344 (11th Cir. 2009)
(vacating the district court's dismissal of Powers's indictment under SORNA on Commerce
Clause grounds, relying on Ambert).
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